L’Encyclopédie méthodique constitue une des entreprises éditoriales les plus imposantes publiées au tournant des Lumières. Conçue par l’éditeur Charles-Joseph Panckoucke, elle s’échelonne sur cinquante ans (1782- 1832). Elle remanie et reprend les volumes de l’Encyclopédie de Diderot et d’Alembert, en substituant à l’ordre alphabétique un ordre des matières. Elle oriente les Lumières vers l’épistémologie positiviste. C’est pourquoi cette encyclopédie, qui demeure pourtant souvent méconnue, revêt aujourd’hui un intérêt considérable, notamment parce qu’elle montre un moment particulier des savoirs qui relient les (...) mots et les choses. Les trois volumes du Dictionnaire d’Architecture, dus à la plume de Quatremère de Quincy, s’inscrivent dans ce cadre éditorial et culturel, et en même temps dans l’histoire longue des théories de l’architecture : ils achèvent une tradition qui remonte à Vitruve. Quatremère de Quincy reprend et corrige Vitruve quand la théorie de ce dernier est démentie par la raison ou par l’histoire. Mais derrière cette critique, Quatremère se bat aussi avec son siècle. En définissant l’architecture par les mots, il retrouve les exigences d’une définition de l’architecture « à l’antique », à savoir par et dans la langue. (shrink)

In 2006, David Carrier (Carrier, 2006, Museum Skepticism: A History of the Display of Art in Public Galleries. Durham: Duke University Press.) coined the term ‘museum skepticism’ to describe the idea that moving artworks into museum settings strips them of essential facets of their meaning; among art historians, this is better known as ‘decontextualization’, ‘denaturing’, or ‘museumization’. Although they do not usually name it directly, many contemporary debates in the philosophy of art are informed by an inclination towards museum skepticism, (...) from work on aesthetic cognitivism (Feagin, Susan, 1995, “Paintings and their places” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73.2: 260-8.) and contextualism (Danto, Arthur C., 1988, “Artifact and Art”, in ART/ARTIFACT: African Art in Anthropological Collections. Exhibition Catalogue. New York: Center for African Art and Prestel Verlag, 18-32.) to cultural appropriation (Eaton, A. W. and Gaskell, Ivan, 2009, “Do subaltern artifacts belong in art museums?,” The Ethics of Cultural Appropriation, ed. James O. Young and Conrad Brunk, Oxford and Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell, 235-67), street art (Baldini, Andrea, 2016, “Street Art: A Reply to Riggle” Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 74.2: 187-91), and the value of authenticity (Korsmeyer, Carolyn, 2016, “Real Old Things” British Journal of Aesthetics, 56.3: 219-31). The very first museum skeptic, however, was Antoine Chrysostôme Quatremère de Quincy (1755-1849). (shrink)

Critique à l’égard des réflexions philosophiques empiristes, Antoine Chrysostome Quatremère de Quincy forgea autour de 1800 une nouvelle théorie de l’art, grâce à une connaissance précoce du criticisme kantien et des esthétiques qui s’en inspirèrent. Il imposa une conception idéaliste de l’art, en opposant un système d’ imitation abstraite du type idéal au traditionnel concept d’ imitation de la nature. En faisant valoir l’existence d’une « puissance d’imaginer » intuitionniste et spontanée, dérivée du concept d’ Einbildungskraft, il proposa (...) un système général des beaux-arts fondé sur une nouvelle métaphysique. Avant Madame de Staël et Victor Cousin, il contribua à diffuser auprès du public français certains débats artistiques outre-Rhin parmi les plus originaux, en soutenant activement les échanges intellectuels entre les deux pays, et notamment les critiques novatrices du mouvement Sturm und Drang dans une perspective spiritualiste. Cet article est une contribution à l’histoire des transferts culturels entre la France et l’Allemagne au début du XIX e siècle, en présentant les grands principes de sa métaphysique de l’art, son interprétation de la mimèsis, mais aussi ses sources pour comprendre les fondements de sa politique des arts à l’aube d’une révolution artistique en Europe. (shrink)

The importance of this dictionary stems from Quatreme're's profound reflections on the nature of architecture: on the principles which are at the source of his rules and on the roles of imitation and invention within tradition. This book provides the first English translation of the theoretical essays from his seminal work, Le Dictionnaire Historique d' Architecture.

Corinne de González De Léon; Classificatory Schemes and the Justification of Educational Content: a re-interpretation of the Hirstian approach, Journal of Philo.

Abstract In this article, we investigate the merits of an enactive view of cognition for the contemporary debate about social cognition. If enactivism is to be a genuine alternative to classic cognitivism, it should be able to bridge the “cognitive gap”, i.e. provide us with a convincing account of those higher forms of cognition that have traditionally been the focus of its cognitivist opponents. We show that, when it comes to social cognition, current articulations of enactivism are—despite their celebrated successes (...) in explaining some cases of social interaction—not yet up to the task. This is because they (1) do not pay sufficient attention to the role of offline processing or “decoupling”, and (2) obscure the cognitive gap by overemphasizing the role of phenomenology. We argue that the main challenge for the enactive view will be to acknowledge the importance of both coupled (online) and decoupled (offline) processes for basic and advanced forms of (social) cognition. To meet this challenge, we articulate a dynamic embodied view of cognition. We illustrate the fruitfulness of this approach by recourse to recent findings on false belief understanding. Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-23 DOI 10.1007/s11097-011-9223-1 Authors Leon C. de Bruin, Department of Philosophy II, Ruhr-University Bochum, Universitätsstr. 150, 44801 Bochum, Germany Lena Kästner, Department of Philosophy II, Ruhr-University Bochum, Universitätsstr. 150, 44801 Bochum, Germany Journal Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Online ISSN 1572-8676 Print ISSN 1568-7759. (shrink)

Deictic (or pointing) gestures are traditionally known to have a simple function: to supply something as the referent of a demonstrative linguistic expression. I argue that deixis can have a more complex function. A deictic gesture can be used to _say something_ in conversation and can thereby become a full discourse move in its own right. To capture this phenomenon, which I call _rich demonstration_, I present an update semantics on which deictic gestures can indicate situations from a conversation’s context (...) and those situations coherently connect to prior discourse to generate information. (shrink)

Empirical evidence suggests that people often confabulate when they are asked about their choices or reasons for action. The implications of these studies are the topic of intense debate in philosophy and the cognitive sciences. An important question in this debate is whether the confabulation studies pose a serious threat to the possibility of self-knowledge. In this paper we are not primarily interested in the consequences of confabulation for self-knowledge. Instead, we focus on a different issue: what confabulation implies for (...) the special status of self-attributions, i.e. first-person authority. In the first part of the paper, we propose that FPA is based on a capacity for self-regulation. Accordingly, FPA depends on the extent to which we are able to bridge the gap between our sayings and doings by aligning our actions with our avowed self-ascriptions and vice versa. FPA is withheld when we fail at such re-alignment. In the second part of the paper, we contrast our view with the accounts of Scaife and Bortolotti :227–249, 2018). We claim that the apparent fact that we cannot reliably distinguish, from a first-person perspective, when we are confabulating and when we are not, does not necessarily undermine FPA. We argue that a systematic failure to align our actions with our self-ascriptions and vice-versa is a genuine threat to FPA. In the last part of the paper, we introduce the concept of self-know-how—the know-how embodied in the way one is disposed to relate to oneself in making sense of oneself with or in the face of others—and briefly explored the importance of diminished or absent self-know-how in clinical cases. (shrink)

According to the BD-model of mindreading, we primarily understand others in terms of beliefs and desires. In this article we review a number of objections against explicit versions of the BD-model, and discuss the prospects of using its implicit counterpart as an explanatory model of early emerging socio-cognitive abilities. Focusing on recent findings on so-called ‘implicit’ false belief understanding, we put forward a number of considerations against the adoption of an implicit BD-model. Finally, we explore a different way to make (...) sense of implicit false belief understanding in terms of keeping track of affordances. (shrink)

For many countries instrumental music tuition in secondary schools is a ubiquitous event that provides situated and personalized instruction in the learning of an instrument. Opportunities and methods through which teachers operate during the COVID-19 outbreak challenged music educators as to how they taught, engaged, and interacted with students across online platforms, with alarm over aerosol dispersement a major factor in maintaining online instrumental music tuition even as students returned to “normal” face to face classes. This qualitative study investigated the (...) practices employed by instrumental music educators in secondary schools in Melbourne, Australia, analyzing teacher perspectives to music tuition amidst the restriction of interaction with students remotely via online means. Thematic analysis of the interview transcripts revealed music educational approaches that fostered connection, empathy and receptiveness to relationship-building, guiding students in slower and deeper learner-centered approaches, asserting pedagogical practices that reinforced and promoted interpersonal connectedness in and through musical experience and discovery. These findings provide a framework for how music educators can facilitate connection, motivation and student autonomy generating personal meaning and commitment to music making and the learning relationship, which can translate to significant student learning and value in the learning music. Exploring teachers’ pedagogical practices and behaviors within this dyadic teacher-student relationship is a significant addition to the literature, enabling the consideration of the type of connective behaviors required to stimulate and develop long-term interest in music. (shrink)

We challenge Gallagher’s distinction between the sense of ownership and the sense of agency as two separable modalities of experience of the minimal self and argue that a careful investigation of the examples provided to promote this distinction in fact reveals that SO and SA are intimately related and modulate each other. We propose a way to differentiate between the various notions of SO and SA that are currently used interchangeably in the debate, and suggest a more gradual reading of (...) the two that allows for various blends of SO and SA. Such an approach not only provides us with a richer phenomenology but also with a more parsimonious view of the minimal self. (shrink)

Proponents of mindshaping argue that third-person folk psychology is not primarily about "reading" mental states for the purpose of behavior prediction and explanation. Instead, they claim that third-person folk psychology is first and foremost a regulative practice -- one that "shapes" mental states in accordance with the norms of a shared folk psychological framework. This paper investigates to what extent the core assumptions behind the mindshaping hypothesis are compatible with an account of first-person folk psychology that is based on the (...) notion of "self-regulative agency.". (shrink)

This paper proposes a reassessment of Hegel’s critical reading of Spinoza and of the charge of acosmism, for which this reading is known. We argue that this charge is actually the consequence of a more fundamental criticism, namely Spinoza’s presumable inability to conceive the unity of the finite and the infinite. According to Hegel, the infinite and the finite remain two poles apart in Spinoza’s metaphysics, which thus fails to be a true monism, insofar as it contains an irreducible duality. (...) Against this reading, we argue that Spinoza’s conception of the causal co-determination of finite modes entails the acknowledgment of their essentially infinite nature. The study of this particular instance of coincidentia oppositorum enables to counter some of Hegel’s criticisms as well as to illuminate a fairly unexplored aspect of Spinoza’s substance monism. (shrink)

This paper proposes a reassessment of Hegel’s critical reading of Spinoza and of the charge of acosmism, for which this reading is known. We argue that this charge is actually the consequence of a more fundamental criticism, namely Spinoza’s presumable inability to conceive the unity of the finite and the infinite. According to Hegel, the infinite and the finite remain two poles apart in Spinoza’s metaphysics, which thus fails to be a true monism, insofar as it contains an irreducible duality. (...) Against this reading, we argue that Spinoza’s conception of the causal co-determination of finite modes entails the acknowledgment of their essentially infinite nature. The study of this particular instance of coincidentia oppositorum enables to counter some of Hegel’s criticisms as well as to illuminate a fairly unexplored aspect of Spinoza’s substance monism. (shrink)

¿Cómo debe entenderse que una de las innovaciones de mayor alcance epocal del pensamiento cartesiano, a saber, su duda metódica, no haya sido adoptada por la inmediata posteridad filosófica de Descartes? Este artículo investiga las razones de esta supuesta desaparición de la duda en las filosofías de Spinoza y Leibniz mediante una revisión del rol de la duda en las Meditaciones de Descartes. Partiendo de una caracterización del proyecto cartesiano como la búsqueda del fundamento, el artículo muestra que la interpretación (...) de Descartes de la realidad inmediata en términos de representación constituye en realidad la apoteosis de una concepción más antigua que percibe la totalidad de lo ente como contingente y vana. De este modo, la duda no es la suspensión libre del juicio, sino el inevitable estado de irresolución que se deriva de la falta de solidez ontológica que muestra la realidad inmediata entendida como imagen o representación. Se muestra entonces que el pensamiento postcartesiano propiamente no elimina la duda, sino que la incorpora como un supuesto básico, lo cual explica por qué no hay un lugar definido para la misma en el discurso. El desarrollo ulterior del pensamiento moderno puede ser explicado de modo decisivo por medio de esta asimilación implícita de la duda y sus consecuencias. (shrink)

¿Cómo debe entenderse que una de las innovaciones de mayor alcance epocal del pensamiento cartesiano, a saber, su duda metódica, no haya sido adoptada por la inmediata posteridad filosófica de Descartes? Este artículo investiga las razones de esta supuesta desaparición de la duda en las filosofías de Spinoza y Leibniz mediante una revisión del rol de la duda en las Meditaciones de Descartes. Partiendo de una caracterización del proyecto cartesiano como la búsqueda del fundamento, el artículo muestra que la interpretación (...) de Descartes de la realidad inmediata en términos de representación constituye en realidad la apoteosis de una concepción más antigua que percibe la totalidad de lo ente como contingente y vana. De este modo, la duda no es la suspensión libre del juicio, sino el inevitable estado de irresolución que se deriva de la falta de solidez ontológica que muestra la realidad inmediata entendida como imagen o representación. Se muestra entonces que el pensamiento postcartesiano propiamente no elimina la duda, sino que la incorpora como un supuesto básico, lo cual explica por qué no hay un lugar definido para la misma en el discurso. El desarrollo ulterior del pensamiento moderno puede ser explicado de modo decisivo por medio de esta asimilación implícita de la duda y sus consecuencias. (shrink)

Criteria of identity should mirror the identity relation in being reflexive, symmetrical, and transitive. However, this logical requirement is only rarely met by the criteria that we are most inclined to propose as candidates. The present paper addresses the question how such obvious candidates are best approximated by means of relations that have all of the aforementioned features, i.e., which are equivalence relations. This question divides into two more basic questions. First, what is to be considered a ‘best’ approximation. And (...) second, how can these best approximations be found? In answering these questions, we both rely on and constructively criticize ground-breaking work done by Timothy Williamson. Guiding ideas of our approach are that we allow approximations by means of overlapping equivalence-relations, and that closeness of approximation is measured in terms of the number of mistakes made by the approximation when compared to the obvious candidate criterion. (shrink)

A series of unnoticeably small changes in an observable property may add up to a noticeable change. Crispin Wright has used this fact to prove that perceptual indiscriminability is a non-transitive relation. Delia Graff has recently argued that there is a 'tension' between Wright's assumptions. But Graff has misunderstood one of these, that 'phenomenal continua' are possible; and the other, that our powers of discrimination are finite, is sound. If the first assumption is properly understood, it is not in tension (...) with but is actually implied by the second, given a plausible physical assumption. (shrink)

This article sets forth a compositional model of ideology by drawing on the tradition of historical materialism and further developing its insights into the aesthetic composition of reality. It demonstrates how ideology is not simply a set of false beliefs but is rather the process by which social agents are composed over time in every dimension of their existence, including their thoughts, practices, perceptions, representations, values, affects, desires, and unconscious drives. By working through a number of diverse debates and authors—ranging (...) from Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels to Louis Althusser, Eduardo Galeano, Rosaura Sánchez, and Paulo Freire—it thereby elucidates how ideology is best understood as an aesthetic process that includes aspect of sense and sense-making, and that therefore requires a collective, cultural revolution as its antidote. (shrink)

O movimento Hare Krishna se tornou bastante popular no Ocidente, principalmente entre os anos 1960 e 1980 intrigando aqueles que esperavam por um campo religioso ocidental constituído somente pelas manifestações de cunho judaico-cristão. No entanto, em torno do tema, estudiosos e praticantes têm pensado sobre o que constituiria o movimento, deixando uma questão que parece não estar respondida claramente: seria o Hare Krishna um “novo” movimento religioso ou uma “antiga” tradição hindu? Para tentar responder a essa problemática, faremos uma análise (...) da história da tradição precedente e às autorrepresentações do movimento Hare Krishna. (shrink)

This volume is the second instalment in the new critical edition of Lev Shestov's complete works which has been entrusted to the Director of the Lev Shestov Society, Dr Ramona Fotiade, by the French publisher, Le Bruit du Temps.

This volume is the second instalment in the new critical edition of Lev Shestov's complete works which has been entrusted to the Director of the Lev Shestov Society, Dr Ramona Fotiade, by the French publisher, Le Bruit du Temps.

The article proposes a novel approach to mental agency that is inspired by Victoria McGeer’s work on self-regulation. The basic idea is that certain mental acts leave further work to be done for an agent to be considered an authoritative self-ascriber of corresponding dispositional mental states. First, we discuss Richard Moran’s account of avowals, which grounds first-person authority in deliberative, self-directed agency. Although this view is promising, we argue that it ultimately fails to confront the empirical gap between occurrent judgments (...) and dispositional beliefs. Second, we show how Victoria McGeer's account of self-regulation allows us to bridge this gap by emphasizing that avowals are only reliable and authoritative insofar as we take certain steps to live up to the commitments inherent in our self-ascriptions. Third, we address the question whether and to what extent self-regulation can be seen as a form of mental agency. Unlike the ‘pure’ deliberative form of mental agency advocated by Moran, which is direct, conscious and intra-personal, we follow McGeer and argue for a notion of mental agency as an indirect, unconscious and inter-personal process of self-regulation. (shrink)

Political parties do not merely reflect social divisions, they actively construct them. While this point has been alluded to in the literature, surprisingly little attempt has been made to systematically elaborate the relationship between parties and the social, which tend to be treated as separate domains contained by the disciplinary division of labor between political science and sociology. This article demonstrates the constructive role of parties in forging critical social blocs in three separate cases, India, Turkey, and the United States, (...) offering a critique of the dominant approach to party politics that tends to underplay the autonomous role of parties in explaining the preferences, social cleavages, or epochal socioeconomic transformations of a given community. Our thesis, drawing on the work of Gramsci, Althusser, and Laclau, is that parties perform crucial articulating functions in the creation and reproduction of social cleavages. Our comparative analysis of the Republican and Democratic parties in the United States, Islamic and secularist parties in Turkey, and the Bharatiya Janata Party and Congress parties in India will demonstrate how “political articulation” has naturalized class, ethnic, religious, and racial formations as a basis of social division and hegemony. Our conclusion is that the process of articulation must be brought to the center of political sociology, simultaneously encompassing the study of social movements and structural change, which have constituted the orienting poles of the discipline. (shrink)